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In this brief discussion, I will address two main issues. The first concerns our understanding 
of the nature of market failure as an evaluative concept. I suggest that we have reason to 
avoid defining market failure solely in relation to the technical notion of Pareto optimality. 
The second issue concerns the authority of individual preferences in market contexts and the 
circumstances in which it might be appropriate to override preferences in order to address 
various kinds of (broadly defined) market failure. I draw some distinctions between different 
kinds of preferences that help us understand the ways in which individual preferences can 
assume authority. Against this background, we can better understand why the responsiveness 
of markets to preferences can be a virtue. However, I also identify ways in which individual 
preferences can lack authority and how, consequently, overriding preferences that might 
otherwise drive market activity can be justified.  
 
MARKET FAILURE AND THE PRIMACY OF JUSTICE 
 
I assume that our interest in assessing the adequacy of actual economic institutional 
arrangements provides the most fundamental reason for articulating an account of market 
failure. Ultimately, we would like our theories to help guide us in deciding whether free 
markets are functioning well or poorly and whether the free market is the most suitable 
mechanism through which certain goods and services are produced and made available to 
persons. With this general observation in mind, let me begin by drawing a distinction 
between narrow market failure and broad market failure. We can treat market failure as a 
narrow technical notion in which the achievement of Pareto optimality is the only salient 
feature of our evaluative stance. On the narrow construal, market failure can be tracked 
against the background of an existing assignment of property rights that is implicitly 
assumed to be legitimate but which may, in fact, be quite unjust. Here questions about the 
existence or pervasiveness of market failure are just questions about the degree to which a 
market in conjunction with an existing property regime can yield Pareto optimal outcomes or 
whether interference with free market activity (e.g., through government regulations or 
restrictions) can improve the situation of some without worsening the condition of others. 
Broad market failure, by contrast, is defined in relation to a more comprehensive set of 
normative criteria. It occurs when a market fails to reliably or adequately generate social 
outcomes that are desirable from the point of view of an authoritative and overarching 
normative standard. Where we judge markets to have failed in this broad way, we assume 
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that the normative criteria against which they are evaluated are the ones that, all things 
considered, are most important. Moreover we implicitly assume, in reaching such a verdict, 
that there is some form of non-market institutional arrangement (or perhaps a regulated 
market arrangement) through which the valued outcomes to which societal efforts are 
appropriately aimed at realizing can be more reliably or feasibly achieved.  
 
There are many competing normative standards to which we might appeal in evaluating the 
functioning of markets in this broad way. For instance, we might ask whether (or the degree 
to which) an unregulated market can reliably satisfy any of the following familiar evaluative 
standards drawn from contemporary discussions of distributive justice: (a) securing basic 
capabilities for all persons (Sen/Nussbaum), (b) providing equal opportunity for welfare 
(Arneson), (c) maximizing aggregate human welfare (Mill), (d) distributing economic 
resources so as to provide the greatest benefit to the least advantaged (Rawls’ difference 
principle) or (e) establishing and maintaining equality of resources (Dworkin). My point is 
not to defend any of these theories of justice but rather to make the simple observation that 
they provide possible criteria for evaluating whether markets are functioning well or poorly. 
Moreover, markets can display Pareto-optimality without satisfying any of these criteria. So 
broad market failure can be present even when narrow market failure is not. For example, a 
free market in primary school education could be technically economically efficient in the 
sense that the upshot of market exchanges is an outcome in which no one’s situation can be 
improved without worsening the situation of at least one person. But an ‘efficient’ outcome 
need not be one in which equality of educational opportunity for children is actually secured. 
If we think that social and economic institutions should, all things considered, ensure that 
children enjoy equal educational opportunities then, on the broad account of market failure, 
we can conclude that the market has failed because permitting it to function does not reliably 
achieve the outcome we have most reason to care about.   
 
The suggestion that the assessment of market outcomes should be oriented to evaluative 
standards besides Pareto optimality raises questions about what the pertinent evaluative 
standards are and about how the relationship between different, perhaps conflicting standards 
should be interpreted. I cannot delve deeply into these crucial issues here but I want to 
observe how discourse about market failure might be affected by acceptance of Rawls’s 
famous claim that “justice is the first virtue of institutions”.1 If, following Rawls, we accept 
the normative primacy of justice then it would seem to follow that our interest in market 
failure should itself be animated by a concern for justice. Yet discussions of market failure, 
especially amongst economists, rarely emphasize the importance of justice per se to the 
evaluation of the functioning of markets. Instead they tend to interpret market failure solely 
in terms of a failure to achieve Pareto optimality. Allowing that justice is the most 
fundamental evaluative criterion against which the functioning of markets should be gauged 
does not mean, of course, that the detection of technical economic inefficiencies is 
normatively insignificant or practically unimportant. We often have good reason to be 
concerned with Pareto sub-optimal outcomes generated by free markets. But we should be 
reluctant to embrace the common assumption that efficiency is the sole or dominant 
evaluative standard for assessing the adequacy of real world market arrangements. Indeed, if 
                                            
1 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, 1971: p. 3. 
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the Rawlsian view concerning the primacy of justice is sound, we should only care about the 
failure of markets to achieve Pareto optimal outcomes to the degree that justice assigns 
importance to the achievement of Pareto optimality. Moreover, the discovery that a market is 
technically efficient does not provide sufficient reason for viewing it as suitable or defensible 
institution for provision and distribution of certain goods. In some instances, we may have 
justice-based reasons to prefer non-market arrangements or highly regulated markets to free 
market arrangements market that are, in the technical sense, efficient. Narrow market failure 
is not a conceptually defective notion but it offers, at best, an incomplete specification of the 
evaluative criteria that are relevant to the goal of assessing the adequacy of actual market 
arrangements. I have suggested that considerations of justice, not technical efficiency, are 
credibly seen as the primary criteria for assessing whether markets are functioning well or 
failing. If this is right then technical inefficiency need not be the only or even the most 
important variety of market failure.  
 
MARKETS AND THE AUTHORITY OF PREFERENCES 
 
One general attraction of markets is the dynamic responsiveness they can display to diverse 
individual preferences. Markets respond to consumer demand and (at least under favourable 
conditions) this means people with different interests and appetites can get what they want. 
The satisfaction of well-formed and reasonable preferences contributes to human wellbeing 
and is thus presumptively desirable from the point of view of justice. However, individual 
preferences are not always well formed and the de facto preferences that individuals display 
in real market settings do not always reliably track wellbeing. This brings us to the second 
general issue I identified in the introduction concerning how we should interpret the 
authority of individual preferences in the context of addressing market failure. Three related 
preliminary points are worth noting. First, the authority of individual preferences is partly a 
function of the circumstances under which they are formed. Preferences that reflect 
ignorance, cognitive impairment (whether temporary, such as intoxication, or permanent, 
such as mental disability) or which are formed under duress or other distorting conditions 
cannot be expected to track wellbeing reliably. In the context of assessing market 
arrangements, we should not assume that markets can be relied upon to furnish what might 
be called the ‘circumstances of authenticity’. The circumstances of authenticity are the 
social, informational, and deliberative conditions that are conducive to the formation of 
individual preferences such that the preferences each person forms track his or her wellbeing 
reasonably well. One way in which markets can fail, in the broad but not necessarily in the 
narrow sense, is by not adequately supplying persons with the circumstances of authenticity. 
Indeed, certain types of market activity, such as aggressive and manipulative advertising that 
preys upon vulnerable aspects of human psychology can be corrosive to the circumstances of 
authenticity.  
 
Second, in interpreting the authority of individual preferences, we need to distinguish 
between different facets and types of preferences. There is a difference between ‘valuational 
preferences’ - i.e., preferences that reflect the ends, goals, or broad projects to which a 
person assigns deep normative significance – and ‘implementation preferences’ – i.e., 
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preferences persons have concerning the strategies and means they wish to employ in pursuit 
of ‘valuational preferences’. I suggest that, at least against the background of decent 
deliberative circumstances, we have reason to assign greater authority to valuational 
preferences than to implementation preferences.2 There is ample evidence from experimental 
psychology that people are poor at various reasoning tasks and susceptible to irrationality.3 
As a consequence, persons sometimes adopt implementation preferences that fail to reliably 
track their valuational preferences.  If, as often seems to be the case, markets respond to 
dubious implementation preferences, then markets will fail to satisfy valuational preferences. 
Since respecting (well-formed) valuational preferences typically has greater normative 
significance than satisfying implementation preferences, it can be legitimate to override 
implementation preferences in the name of promoting valuational preferences.  
 
Finally, we should also distinguish between the ‘preferences within a market’ and 
‘preferences for a market’. Once we have determined that markets are appropriate 
institutions for allocating goods etc. in a given area, we generally have strong reasons to 
respect the authority of well-formed preferences that persons display in the market. 
However, preferences for a market – i.e., preferences that a market be permitted to operate in 
a certain area – generally carry little presumptive normative force. Indeed, considerations of 
justice often permit or even require the frustration of some preferences for markets. 
 
THREE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR OVERRIDING MARKET PREFERENCES 
 
By way of quickly drawing the different strands of the foregoing discussion together, I will 
sketch three plausible justifications for overriding individual preferences.4 Each of these 
justifications can be seen as a way of addressing a kind of broad market failure. In each case, 
allowing markets to function and respond to the de facto individual preferences that are 
expressed in market contexts can generate outcomes that are arguably objectionable from the 
point of view of justice. We can see how intervention into the functioning of markets has a 
justification that is not essentially tied to the achievement of Pareto optimality. In this way, 
each justification is tied to the broader and more generally normatively significant 
conception of market failure.  
 
First, consider a Socratic justification for supplementing and perhaps limiting the way 
markets function. Socrates famously claimed that the ‘unexamined life is not worth living’. 
His observation reminds us of the importance of being able to reflect upon and, if necessary, 
revise our preferences, especially our valuational preferences. Markets may fail to provide 
                                            
2 This does not mean that valuational preferences cannot be mistaken but it is typically more difficult 
and controversial to identify defective valuational preferences than it is to diagnose problematic 
implementation preferences. 
3 See Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (Editors) Judgment under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
4 The labels I attach to these justifications – Socratic, Homeric and Solomonic – are for thematic and 
mnemonic purposes only. In using them I am not making exegetical claims about the precise 
interpretation of classical texts. 
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conditions that are most conducive to successful Socratic reflection. For instance, they may 
fail to provide a diverse and vibrant aesthetic and intellectual culture of the sort that can 
nourish potentially valuable options and ideas. The existence of a rich culture can enhance 
the circumstances of authenticity but such a culture may be inadequately provided by the 
market. This type of failure will often not be narrow market failure because the sense in 
which the public culture might be deficient often cannot be coherently gauged in terms of 
what economic goods private consumers are willing to pay for. The difficulty is not a classic 
public goods problem in which culture, perhaps due to free rider problems, is undersupplied.5 
Instead a market-supplied culture can be poor in the sense that it does not make available 
potentially valuable but underappreciated deliberative resources/opportunities. For instance, 
various types of valuable aesthetic and intellectual resources may be unavailable not because 
they lack value (especially with respect to supplementing the context in which deliberation 
about value takes place) but simply because they are currently unpopular. In these 
conditions, government might be justified in overriding market preferences (e.g., via 
programs of taxation and subsidization) in order to secure some cultural resources that are 
plausibly linked to improving the circumstances of authenticity. We need not assume that 
markets, by responding to current preferences, adequately supply the conditions that best 
facilitate Socratic examination of our lives and valuational preferences. 
 
Second, now consider a Homeric justification for overriding individual preferences. Homer’s 
Ulysses, it will be recalled, had himself tied to the mast so as to avoid yielding to the 
temptation of the dangerous, but alluring, calls of the Sirens. Ulysses presents a classic case 
of a person whose implementation preferences (e.g., to heed the Sirens’ calls) are not in sync 
with his valuational preferences. Where such a divergence can be detected, an appropriate 
remedy is to put in place obstacles to the satisfaction of defective implementation 
preferences. Research from behavioural economics reveals various ways in which the 
strategies that agents employ in pursuit of their valuational preferences are ineffective or 
irrational. Thus anchoring effects, endowment effects, and effort aversion are ubiquitous and 
generate various kinds of dubious implementation preferences.6 Markets that are responsive 
to defective implementation preferences will generate obviously undesirable outcomes. So in 
some contexts, we can assist individuals in realizing their valuational preferences by 
impeding or frustrating their implementation preferences. The Homeric justification provides 
a rationale for various familiar types of state regulation of markets. Government can tie us to 
the mast in various ways thereby frustrating our implementation preferences but allowing us 
to better achieve valuational preferences. For instance, if, as seems to be the case, individuals 
tend to make poor choices about retirement planning, governments can pressure people to 
save at a greater rate than they are unreflectively inclined to do.7 
                                            
5 On this point see Ronald Dworkin ‘Can A Liberal State Support the Arts’ in A Matter of Principle, 
Harvard University Press, 1985. 
6 See Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions, Harper 
Collins 2008.  
7 See Richard H. Thayer and Cass Sunstein Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and 
Happiness, Yale University Press 2008. One gentle device favoured by Thayer and Sunstein to 
encourage more retirement savings is to have employee savings programs in which employees must 
contribute unless they opt out. This is in contrast to the arrangements in which employees must ‘opt 
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Finally, consider a Solomonic justification for limiting preferences for markets. In resolving 
a custody dispute between two women, King Solomon proposed cutting baby in half and 
dividing the child between the women. One woman preferred this solution to the possibility 
of getting nothing, while the other woman preferred losing the baby altogether but letting it 
survive. Solomon recognized that the real mother was the one who preferred to save the 
child’s life even at the expense of losing access to her baby. Ultimately, of course, Solomon 
wisely overrode the expressed preferences of both women and awarded the child to the real 
mother. Justice was served by frustrating the expressed preferences of persons. The story of 
Solomon’s choice does not involve overriding preferences expressed in a market setting but 
we can easily extrapolate and apply the general lesson about how justice can trump 
preference satisfaction to market examples. Consider, for instance, the preferences that 
individuals can have for the creation of certain types of markets.8 On many credible 
conceptions of justice, there are powerful reasons to frustrate or block preferences 
individuals have for markets (even where the creation or existence of such markets is 
technically efficient) because the existence of a market generates or contributes to unfair 
disadvantage. An important example of this is the preference that some people have for a 
market in private health insurance. Individuals who have good overall health prospects may 
find it advantageous to secure private health insurance. Such individuals can pool their risks 
with other low risk consumers and thereby achieve good health insurance coverage at a 
lower rate than they could obtain if they were forced to share health costs with persons 
whose overall health prospects are poor (e.g., those with serious ‘pre-existing’ medical 
problems). But permitting markets in private health insurance can impede the access of 
persons with poor health prospects to adequate health insurance. If, as seem plausible, health 
insurance should be available to all on a fair and equal basis, then there is a strong justice-
based rationale for frustrating the preferences some individuals have for access to a market 




There are two principal points I hope to have motivated in the foregoing remarks. First, the 
narrow, technical conception of market failure is of limited normative significance. What we 
should care about in assessing the functioning of economic arrangements is the degree to 
which they contribute to the realization of objectives that have overall normative 
significance, especially justice. Although narrow market failure is often important, it tracks 
only a subset of the evaluative considerations that are relevant to overall assessments of the 
adequacy of market institutional arrangements. Second, although the responsiveness of 
markets to preferences is often a good thing, we should not assume that sensitivity to the de 
facto market preferences of persons is always desirable. Preferences vary in the normative 
                                            
in’ to join a savings program. Changing the default to participation provides employees with a gentle 
‘nudge’ in the direction of the saving plan that most likely serves their interests.  
8 These preferences can be rational in the sense that they may accurately track the actual interests of 
the people who have them.  
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authority they command and there are, consequently, various reasons to regulate, control and 
otherwise to interfere with even technically efficient markets. 
 
 
 
